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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
There are several reasons why the district court properly decided to dismiss the charges in
this case, all of which are based on the fact that the State disposed of the truck which was central
to this case after only 19 days, even before the preliminary hearing.
First, the district court decided this case, at least in part, under the more-protective Idaho
Constitution. The State has not raised any issue regarding the Idaho Constitution in this appeal;
it has only argued this case under one of the competing standards that exists under the federal
Constitution. As such, the State has waived any argument as to state constitutional issue, and
this Court should simply affirm the district court's decision on that uncontested basis.
Second, the State's argument under the federal Constitution is contrary to the applicable
precedent. The facts of this particular case reveal that the district court properly decided this
case under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which means the State's arguments under
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), are simply irrelevant.

Third, even if Youngblood were the applicable standard, the district court still properly
dismissed the charges in this case under the concept of right result, wrong theory. Specifically,
the district court's conclusion that there was not bad faith in the State's intentional action to so
quickly dispose of the truck is not supported by the record.
For any of these reasons, Keith Sarbacher contends this Court should affirm the district
court's decision to dismiss the charges in this case.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case relates to Mr. Sarbacher's purchase of a salvaged pickup truck. (See Prelim.
Tr., p.126, Ls.3-4 (Mr. Sarbacher testifying that he believed he was buying a salvaged vehicle);
Prelim. Tr., p.105, Ls.13-17 (the officer testifying that he contacted one of the people listed on
the title Mr. Sarbacher had, and he was told that truck had been totaled).) 1 Mr. Sarbacher
explained that a friend of his, Mike Smith, had made an offer to sell him the truck via a JPay app
while they were both in jail. (Prelim. Tr., p.126, Ls.14-21.) Once Mr. Sarbacher was released,
he went to make the purchase, but as Mr. Smith was still incarcerated, Mr. Sarbacher actually
conducted the transaction with an agent of Mr. Smith's, Darrell Tully. (See Prelim. Tr., p.123,
Ls.5-12; R., p.149.)
At the time of the purchase, Mr. Sarbacher checked the VIN number showing underneath
the front windshield and found that it matched the title document proffered for the truck.
(Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.5-15.)

However, Mr. Sarbacher explained that, due to several other

irregularities on the title documents, he requested a bill of sale. 2 (Prelim Tr., p.147, Ls.9-18.)
The truck was also in rough shape, as, for example, it was missing the front windshield, tail
lights, and headlights. (Prelim. Tr., p.17, Ls.2-5, ) It also had a push-button ignition system,
which several witnesses described as a "kill switch" or "dead switch," rather than a key-operated
ignition system. (E.g., Prelim. Tr., p.27, Ls.19-21, p.44, Ls.19-21; Prelim. Tr., p.93, L.20 - p.94,
L.2, ) Mr. Sarbacher fixed the truck up, drove it around town, and even mentioned it to his
probation officer. (Prelim. Tr., p.114. Ls.15-17, p.115, L.23 - p.116, Ls.12-14.)
1

Citations to "Prelim. Tr.," refer to the electronic document named "SC# 47208-2019 Exhibit to
Clerk's Record," which contains the transcript of the preliminary hearing held in this case. (See,
e.g., R., p.147 (the district court relying on the transcript of the preliminary hearing to rule on
motions).)
2
The bill of sale was proffered, but ultimately, not admitted as evidence. (See Prelim. Tr., p.136,
Ls.4-5.)
2

However, when Devin Hunt saw Mr. Sarbacher driving the truck on February 27, 2019,
he recognized it as a truck of his which had been stolen from him several years before.
(R., p.147 (the district court's findings of fact).)
Mr. Sarbacher.

(R., pp.147-48.)

He called the police, who stopped

Mr. Sarbacher was cooperative with officers, and they

handcuffed him and put him in the back of a police vehicle. (R., p.148.) He was not, however,
informed of his Miranda rights at that time. 3 (R., p.148.)
Officer Chris Middleton proceeded to ask Mr. Sarbacher questions about where he had
gotten the truck. (R., p.148.) He also looked at the VIN plate under the front windshield and felt
the rivets holding it in place were abnormal. (R., p.149.) However, he noted the VIN number
showing on the car matched the registration documents Mr. Sarbacher had. (Prelim. Tr., p.85,
Ls.7-8.)
Because the truck was reported stolen, the officers decided to have it towed. The tow
truck driver, Bernard Schatz, happened to be Mr. Sarbacher's new employer, and he explained he
had actually talked with Mr. Sarbacher about the truck the day before. (E.g., Prelim. Tr., p.55,
Ls.6-13.) Mr. Schatz's recounted discussion did not match what Mr. Sarbacher had told Officer
Middleton. (See R., p.149.) As such, Officer Middleton arrested Mr. Sarbacher for possession
of stolen property and transported him from the scene. (See Prelim. Tr., p.93, Ls.13-15.)
Meanwhile, other officers were trying, unsuccessfully, to start the truck, so they could
load it for towing, Mr. Sarbacher explained about the kill switch.
Ls.13-21; Exhibit 2, ~9:20:45.) 4

(See Prelim. Tr., p.93,

Ultimately, Officer Middleton explained that Mr. Schatz

"figured out how to start it from underneath." (Prelim. Tr., p.94, Ls.4-6; see R., pp.162, 180 (the
parties describing this as testimony that the ignition was "hotwired").)
3
4

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Exhibit 2 is the video from Officer Middleton's car.

3

The State charged Mr. Sarbacher for possession of property when he knew or should
have known it was stolen on February 28, 2019. (R., pp.7-8.) The next day, Mr. Sarbacher filed
a request for discovery, including of any "tangible objects . . . which are material to the
preparation of the defense or intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial, or obtained
from or belonging to the Defendant." (R., p.26.) The State offered its first discovery response
on March 13, 2019. (See R., p.43.)
However, "just prior to the preliminary hearing," 5 and "mere days after the State's first
response to discovery," Officer Middleton released the truck to the insurance company, which
subsequently sold it. (R., p.199 (the district court's findings of fact); see also R., p.202 (in
support of the State's subsequent motion to reconsider, the officer clarifying the truck was
released on March 18, 2019).) Mr. Sarbacher was not provided an opportunity to examine or
investigate the truck before it was released from the department's possession. (R., p.199.)
Unaware of this fact, Mr. Sarbacher proceeded to file several pretrial motions, including a
motion to suppress the statements he made while in custody in the back of the police car.
(R., pp.86-92, 99-101.) After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to suppress those

statements. (R., pp.147-54.)
After the district court granted the motion to suppress, the State filed additional
supplemental discovery responses.

(R., pp.138-45, 156-59.)

Based on those disclosures,

Mr. Sarbacher determined additional evidence was needed or had become more relevant than it
initially appeared, and so, he requested the opportunity to examine the truck. (R., p.161.) At that
time, he was informed that the State no longer had possession of the truck. (R., p.161; accord

5

The preliminary hearing was held on March 20, 2019. (R., p.60.)
4

R., p.197 (the district court's findings of fact).) Upon learning the truck was gone, he filed a
motion to dismiss the charges based on the destruction of that evidence. (R., pp.160-61)
Mr. Sarbacher argued that the State's actions in this regard violated not only his due
process rights under the federal constitution, but under the Idaho Constitution as well.
(R., p.160.) He specifically argued that the Idaho Constitution provided more protections than its
federal counterpart in this regard.

(R., pp.163-65; Tr., p.9, L.2 - p.12, L.12 (citing State v.

Leatherwood, 104 Idaho 100 (Ct. App. 1982).)6 He identified three specific aspects of the truck
that he wanted to physically examine: (1) the VIN plate, specifically for DNA or fingerprint
evidence; (2) the rivets holding the VIN plate to evaluate their appearance and any marks on
them, and to compare them to other rivets found in the truck; and (3) to examine the functioning
of the push button/kill switch ignition system. (R., pp.161-62; see Prelim. Tr., p.98, Ls.3-18 (the
officer testifying about the other rivets found in the truck).) He also argued, as an alternative to
dismissal, that the district court give a spoliation instruction and suppress any evidence from the
truck itself (Tr., p.14, Ls.1-8.)
The prosecutor conceded that the truck was material to this case. (R., p.180.) She also
acknowledged that Officer Middleton had called her office to ask about releasing the truck, and
the prosecutor told the officer to take "steps to preserve what he considered of evidentiary
value." (Tr., p.18, L.25 - p.19, L.3.) The prosecutor asserted that the officer had subsequently
taken pictures of the car, including of the VIN plate, rivets, and ignition system. (R., p.181.)
However, it does not appear that any such pictures were offered as exhibits at that time. (See
R., pp.177-82 (the prosecutor's objection to dismissal not referencing any attached exhibits);

6

Citations to "Tr." refer to the electronic document titled "SC# 47208-2019 Transcript," which
contains the transcript of the hearing on the motion to dismiss at issue in this appeal. Citations
thereto will use the electronic page numbers, as opposed to the transcript page numbers.
5

Tr., p.7, Ls.1-6 (indicating no exhibits were offered at the hearing); see generally R., pp.233-34
(the certificate of exhibits and exhibits log); Exhibits 7 ; but see R., pp.176, 194 (supplemental
discovery requests filed after Mr. Sarbacher's motion to dismiss indicating photographs were
being disclosed to defense counsel at that time).) Ultimately, the prosecutor argued the motion
to dismiss should be denied per Youngblood because Mr. Sarbacher had failed to show the state
acted in bad faith. (R., pp.177-82.) She did not make a separate argument with respect to the
Idaho Constitution. (See Tr., p.17, Ls.14-22 (arguing only that Leatherwood was inapplicable
because it was discussing only the question of materiality, which the State had conceded); see
generally R., pp.177-82.)

At the hearing on his motion, Mr. Sarbacher pointed out that, under the state
constitutional standard, he was not required to show bad faith when the exculpatory nature of the
lost evidence was known through indirect evidence. (Tr., p.10, L.19 - p.11, L.12.) He also
pointed out that, if the exculpatory nature of the lost evidence was not known, it was still the
State's burden under the state constitutional standard to prove that its actions were reasonable
and consistent with policy. (Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.1.) He argued the State had failed to meet
that burden as it provided no evidence of its policies for disposing of evidence. (Tr., p.12,
Ls.1-4.)
Under the federal standard, Mr. Sarbacher countered the State's arguments about bad
faith by pointing out that, in this case, the State had intentionally (as opposed to inadvertently)
released the truck within days of its first discovery notice and were not providing meaningful
answers as to why they decided to do that.

(Tr., p.12, Ls.13-24 (describing that a "scary"

situation for a person facing prison time to be confronted with).)
7

He also argued that

"Exhibits" refers to the electronic file "SC# 47280-2019 Exhibits," which contains all the
exhibits offered and/or admitted at the other hearings held in this case.
6

Mr. Sarbacher was entitled to an inference that the destroyed evidence would be favorable to his
case because the state's actions were intentional. (Tr., p.13, Ls.5-15 (citing "[Stuart] v. State,
127 Idaho 806 [(1995)]").)
The prosecutor continued to argue that Mr. Sarbacher had to show bad faith and that he
had not met his burden in that regard. (Tr., p.15, L.8 - p.18, L.9.) She also maintained that the
State had, in fact, made earnest efforts (i.e., not acted in bad faith) because Officer Middleton
had taken photographs of the truck and the defense had been able to cross-examine the officer at
the preliminary hearing. (Tr., p.14, L.19 - p.5, L.7.)
The district court ultimately agreed with Mr. Sarbacher and dismissed the charge in this
case. (R., pp.197-99.) The district court based its decision on the rule articulated in Brady and
the standard for evaluation under the Idaho Constitution set forth in Leatherwood.
(R., pp.197-99.)

Under those standards, it found that the truck was, indeed, material to

Mr. Sarbacher's defense because "[t]he vehicle was not recently stolen, and this Court has
suppressed [Mr.] Sarbacher' s responses to law enforcement questioning at the stop. Therefore,
the condition of and alleged physical alterations to the vehicle comprise the circumstantial
foundation of the State's case." (R., p.198.) As such, the loss of the truck "resulted in an
irreparable infringement on [Mr.] Sarbacher's due process rights." (R., p.199.) That was true,
the district court concluded, even though it did not find the State had acted in bad faith in
disposing of the truck. (R., p.199.)
The State filed a motion to reconsider based on an affidavit of Officer Middleton.
(R., pp.201-04.) He asserted that he had called trial counsel's office to inform him that he would
be disposing of the truck and that he heard trial counsel tell his secretary (who answered the
call), "That is their problem, let them deal with it." (R., p.201.) Officer Middleton also asserted

7

that, when Mr. Sarbacher subsequently came into the office to collect his other personal
property, the officer told him he would be releasing the truck.

(R., p.202.)

However, he

acknowledged that Mr. Sarbacher had told him at that time that he thought exculpatory evidence,
particularly in the form of fingerprints around the VIN plate, would be in the truck. (R., p.202.)
Mr. Sarbacher replied, arguing the officer's affidavit was false or recklessly misleading.
Trial counsel explained that, on the date the officer called his office, not only was trial counsel
on a plane as part of a family vacation, but that the prosecutor's office had been aware he was
out of the office. (R., p.208.) Trial counsel also asserted that the message left with his secretary
did not include notice that the truck was going to be released. (R., p.209.) Additionally, he
argued it was improper for the officer to have released the truck when Mr. Sarbacher had already
told him that he wanted to examine the truck for potential exculpatory evidence. (R., p.210 (also
noting the potential issues with the officer continuing to talk to a party who was represented by
counsel).)
The district court denied the motion for reconsideration without explanation. (R., p.221.)
After filing the motion to reconsider, the State also filed a notice of appeal which was timely
from the order dismissing the charges. (R., pp.213-15.) On appeal, the State has contended only
that the decision to dismiss was not appropriate because there was no fmding of bad faith under

Youngblood. 8

(App. Br., p.5.)

It also asserted that Mr. Sarbacher had not shown the lost

evidence had apparent exculpatory value at the time it was destroyed, also required by

Youngblood. (App. Br., pp.5-9.) It did not mention the prosecutor's concession of materiality,
nor did it mention the Idaho Constitution. (See generally App. Br.)
8

While the State has not expressly articulated the basis on which it believes the district court
abused its discretion, it appears the State is asserting the district court used the wrong legal
standard - that it should have analyzed the case under Youngblood instead of Brady. (See
generally App. Br.)
8

ISSUES
As the State's listed issues are unduly narrow, Mr. Sarbacher restates the issues as
follows:
I.

Whether the district court correctly dismissed the charges under Idaho Constitution.

II.

Whether the district court correctly dismissed the charges under the federal Constitution.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed The Charges Under Idaho Constitution

A.

Standard Of Review
Principally, appellate courts review the decision to dismiss a charge for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184-85 (2002), disapproved of on other grounds. The
district court abuses its discretion only if it failed to recognize the issue as one of discretion, it
acted beyond the bounds of its discretion, it acted inconsistently with the applicable legal
precedents, or it did not reach its decision in an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018). However, questions oflaw within the context of the review of a
motion to dismiss are evaluated de nova. State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 818 (2000),
overruled on other grounds.

B.

This Court Should Dismiss The State's Appeal Because It Has Failed To Challenge One
Of The Bases - The State Constitutional Basis - On Which The District Court Made Its
Decision
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that "[w ]here a lower court makes a ruling

based on two alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the
appellate court must affirm on the uncontested basis." Ballad v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 699 (2016).
That is because, when a party does not provide authority or argument on an issue, it has waived
that issue on appeal.

State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996); see also I.AR. 35(a).

Moreover, new issues cannot be raised for the first time in the reply brief E.g., Doe v. Doe, 160
Idaho 854, 860 (2016).

10

In this case, the district court quoted the following language from Leatherwood m
explaining its decision:
We believe that conceptually there should be-and in actuality there is now
recognized to be-a unified standard of materiality in Idaho. This standard
governs application of the due process clause of Art. 1, § 13, Idaho Constitution,
to those cases where evidence has been withheld by the prosecution, and in those
cases-like the one before us-where evidence has not been preserved, but its
nature can be determined indirectly through other evidence or testimony. We hold
that such evidence is "material" under this standard if, viewed in relation to all
competent evidence admitted at trial, it appears to raise a reasonable doubt
concerning the defendant's guilt.
(R., p.198 (quoting Leatherwood, 104 Idaho at 105).) Essentially, what Leatherwood held was
that the analysis conducted under Brady would also, under the Idaho Constitution, apply to cases
where the nature of the destroyed evidence was known. See Leatherwood, 104, Idaho at 101-05.
The Court of Appeals explained that the Idaho Constitution focused on materiality, rather
than bad faith, because the fundamental focus in this context was on the defendant's
constitutional right to due process. See id. (indicating that due process may still be lacking even
if the State did not act in bad faith).) Because of that fundamental focus, the Court of Appeals
also explained that, for cases where the exculpatory nature of the lost evidence was unknown, "it
would appear necessary to focus primarily upon the reasonableness of the government's conduct,

placing a heavy burden upon the government to show that none of its procedures, or the conduct
of its agents, has been tainted by disregard for an accused's right to a fair trial." Id. at 103
(emphasis added); compare Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 (explaining that, under the federal
constitution, when the exculpatory value is unknown, the defendant bears the burden to prove
bad faith). Idaho's courts have continued to rely on Leatherwood in the wake of Youngblood.

See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 411-12 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Bruno, 119 Idaho
199, 201-02 (Ct. App. 1990); see also State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 95 (1989) (examining a claim

11

raised under Leatherwood and endorsing an analysis which runs contrary to Youngblood),
overruled on other grounds. 9

9

Idaho is not alone in rejecting Youngblood's bright-line rule. Other courts examining this issue
have identified sixteen states, including Idaho - Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia - which have either expressly recognized such
protections under their state constitutions or endorsed analyses which are contrary to
Youngblood. See, e.g., Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 549 n. * (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment) (collecting cases); State v. Frasure, 2008-Ohio-1504, 2008 WL 835820, *6 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2008) (collecting cases); Pena v. State, 226 S.W.3d 634, 651-53 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007)
(collecting cases), judgment reversed; Pena v. State, 166 S.W.3d 274, 279 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App.
2005) (collecting cases; while this case and its successor (226 S.W.3d 634) were ultimately
resolved on different grounds, that does not detract from the value of their explanations of what
other states have done in this regard),judgment vacated; see also People v. Voltaire, 941 N.E.2d
270, 274 (Ill. Ct. App. 2010) (refusing to find a state constitutional protection in this area
because the defendant had not made sufficient argument in that regard, but also rejecting the idea
that the evaluation of the government actions as good or bad faith was the dispositive factor
under Youngblood).
The states rejecting Youngblood have done so for a variety of reasons. For example,
there may still be questions of fundamental fairness with respect to the right to due process even
without bad faith. E.g. State v. Gibney, 825 A.2d 32, 42-43 (Vt. 2003). Likewise, Youngblood
creates a perverse incentive for the State to destroy evidence because the standard it set is so high
that relief will never be granted in that context. See, e.g., Thorne v. Dept of Public Safety, 774
P.2d 1326, 1331 n.9 (Alaska 1989). The inherent problems with Youngblood's standard are
actually evidenced by Mr. Youngblood' s case itself Many years after that opinion was issued,
Mr. Youngblood finally got new tests of the evidence which the lost evidence would have
contained and he was exonerated based on the test of that evidence. See Barbara Whitaker,
"DNA Frees Inmate Years After Justices Reject Plea," N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2000), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/l 1/us/dna-frees-inmate-years-after-justices-rejected-plea.html.
Still, a minority of states - Arizona, California, Georgia, North Carolina, Ohio, and
Washington - have held the protections under their state constitutions to be co-extensive with
Youngblood. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 594 n.20 (Conn. 1995) (collecting cases);
Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 193 (Md. Ct. App. 2010) (collecting cases); see also Collins v.
Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky. 1997) (embracing the Youngblood analysis
without resolving the question of whether the state constitution was more protective). However,
even within that set of cases, the courts are not necessarily lock-step with Youngblood. See Cost,
10 A.3d at 193 (explaining that Maryland would join Arizona and Iowa in avoiding the
conclusion dictated by Youngblood through application of their state evidentiary rules); see also
Frasure, 2008-Ohio-1504, 2008 WL 835820, **6-7 (noting the modem trend is moving away
from the bright-line rule established in Youngblood before conceding it was precedentially bound
to apply Youngblood).
12

On appeal, the State has only argued error under the federal constitution. (See generally
App. Br. (arguing under Youngblood).)

Leatherwood at all.

It has not mentioned the Idaho Constitution or

(See generally App. Br.) Therefore, as Ballard directs, this Court should

affirm the district court's dismissal order on that uncontested basis. 10

C.

If This Court Evaluates The Merits Of The State Constitutional Analysis, It Should Still
Affirm The District Court's Decision To Dismiss The Charges On That Basis

Leatherwood established two standards, and the difference between them turns on
whether the lost evidence's "nature can be determined indirectly through other evidence or
testimony." Leatherwood, l 04 Idaho at 105. In this case, the nature of the lost evidence was
established by the other information and testimony in the record - an examination of the
condition and appearance of the modifications to the truck, particularly the rivets and the ignition
system, would undermine or contradict the officer's testimony and the State's case.

(See

R., pp.161-62, 198-99.) Those examinations would have contradicted the officer's testimony
and made the circumstantial basis of the State's case (that Mr. Sarbacher, seeing the condition of
the truck, should have known it was stolen) less likely true. As such, it was exculpatory. See,

e.g., State v. Holden, 126 Idaho 755, 757-58 (Ct. App. 1995) (indicating that impeachment
evidence is exculpatory evidence).
Since the exculpatory value of this evidence was known, the test under the Idaho
constitution looks at whether the evidence was "material" to the case. Leatherwood, l 04 Idaho

10

In fact, it is not even clear the State could raise a challenge to the state constitutional issue in
this appeal because the prosecutor did not take a position on the state constitutional issue below.
(See, e.g., Tr., p.17, Ls.14-22 (arguing only that Leatherwood was inapplicable because it was
discussing only materiality and the State had conceded that point); see generally R., pp.177-82.)
"To be clear, both the issue and the party's position on the issue must be raised before the trial
court for it to be properly preserved for appeal." State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, _ , 439 P.3d
1267, 1271 (2019).
13

at 105. Evidence is material "if, viewed in relation to all competent evidence admitted at trial, it
appears to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt." Id. Moreover, if the
evidence was material, its destruction constitutes a due process violation '"irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."' Id. at 101 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
In this case, the State conceded that the truck was material.

(R., p.180; Tr., p.17,

Ls.14-22.) That concession alone should resolve the question under the Idaho Constitution and

Leatherwood.
Regardless, the district court actually explained how the missing evidence could raise a
reasonable doubt as to guilt - the alterations and condition of the truck were the basis on which
the State's case rested. (R., pp.198-99; see also Section II(C) infra, discussing how the State's
arguments under the federal constitution actually reveal that the truck was material to this case).)
Therefore, Mr. Sarbacher could raise a reasonable doubt by impeaching the officer's testimony
about those changes based on his own expert's examination of those alleged changes. If, for
example, the kill-switch ignition worked as Mr. Sarbacher explained, that would tend to show a
reasonable person would not have suspected the car was stolen. The same is true regarding the
size and appearance of the rivets.
As such, even if this Court considers the merits of the Idaho Constitution's more
protective standard, it should still affirm the district court's decision to dismiss the charge in this
case.
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II.
The District Court Correctly Dismissed The Charges Under The Federal Constitution

A.

Standard Of Review
As discussed in Section I(A), supra, overarchingly, appellate courts review the decision

to dismiss a charge for an abuse of discretion, but will review questions of law within that
analysis de novo. Card, 137 Idaho at 184-85; Hammersley, 134 Idaho at 818.

B.

The District Court Properly Applied The Standard Articulated In Brady Because The
Nature Of The Exculpatory Value Of The Destroyed Evidence Was Known
The State's implicit argument - that the district court should have applied Youngblood

instead of Brady - is based on a critical misunderstanding of the relevant case law and facts of
this case.

Youngblood only applies to cases "where the destroyed evidence is of unknown

value." Stuart, 127 Idaho at 816. Otherwise, Brady, as refined by Bagley, controls. Id. at 815
(citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
As discussed in Section I(C), supra, the value of the destroyed evidence in this case was
known. (See R., pp.198-99.) Therefore, per Stuart, the district court properly applied Brady
under the federal constitution. The State has not offered any alternative argument under the

Brady standard. (See generally App. Br.) Therefore, if this Court agrees that Brady controls, the
State has waived any challenge in that regard in this appeal. E.g., Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. As
such, this Court should simply affirm that basis as well.

15

C.

Even If This Case Should Have Been Analyzed Under Youngblood, This Court Should
Still Affirm The Order Of Dismissal Under The Doctrine Of Right-Result, WrongTheory

1.

The record makes it clear that the potential exculpatory value of the truck itself
was evident at the time it was disposed of

Youngblood applies when the exculpatory value of the lost evidence is unknown, such as

when testing for trace evidence could have been conducted on the lost evidence.

See

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58-59; Stuart, 127 Idaho at 816. A due process violation only exists

under Youngblood if the evidence was destroyed in bad faith. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58-59.
The duty to preserve evidence in that context also only extends if the exculpatory value of the
evidence was apparent at the time the evidence was destroyed. Nelson v. State, 157 Idaho 847,
856 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)).
To that latter point, Idaho's courts have also recognized that, in the analysis under the
federal standard, "[w ]here the value of the evidence is unknown, the materiality and prejudice
elements are presumed and the inquiry focuses on the presence of bad faith." State v. Lewis, 144
Idaho 64, 66-67 (2007); State v. Edney, 145 Idaho 694, 696 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Stuart, 127
Idaho at 816-17 (remanding a case for the district court to consider the defendant's claim of
improper destruction of evidence while applying this sort of favorable inference). This sort of
presumption is common in cases of spoliation and turns on whether the act of destruction was
intentional as opposed to inadvertent, (as opposed to whether the act was done with good or bad
faith). George L. Blum, et al, 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 252 (Feb. 2020 Update) (noting also
that the presumption will not arise if the destruction was a matter of routine, and that routine was
carried out without fraudulent intent). This presumption means that, even where the defendant
fails to prove exculpatory value of the destroyed evidence, "that is not preclusive of his claim if
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there was bad faith in the destruction of evidence." Lewis, 144 Idaho at 67. Thus, the State's
arguments about whether the exculpatory value of this evidence was known to Officer Middleton
when he released the truck are, ultimately, irrelevant.
In fact, while the State did cite Lewis for its definition of bad faith, it did not mention the
presumption of materiality, much less try to explain why the presumption it recognized should
not apply in this case, and it did not mention Stuart at all. (See Resp. Br., p.5; see generally App.
Br.) It also did not mention the prosecutor's concession of materiality. (See generally App. Br.)
The Stuart/Lewis presumption does, in fact, apply in this case (if it were properly analyzed under
Youngblood) because the value of the evidence would be unknown, and, as the State also
effectively conceded below, the officer acted intentionally when the evidence was lost. (See
Tr., p.18, L.25 - p.19, L.3 (the prosecutor acknowledging the officer called her office to ask
about releasing the truck).) As a result, the State's arguments - that the evidence did not have
any apparent exculpatory value at the time it was destroyed - are, at best, irrelevant, and at
worst, improper because the material exculpatory value of that evidence is presumed. See also
State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (holding that, on appeal, the State cannot raise an
issue contrary to a concession it made below).
At any rate, the State's arguments about whether the potential exculpatory value was
apparent to Officer Middleton when he released the truck are disproved by the record. For
example, the State contends that any exculpatory evidence from the truck was preserved in
photographs taken by Officer Middleton. (See App. Br., p.6.) However, no such photographs
have been included in the appellate record. 11 (See generally Exhibits, Record.) Idaho's courts
have made it clear that, when the appellant fails to provide pertinent portions of the record on
11

It is not apparent from the record whether those photographs were actually submitted for the
district court's consideration below. (See generally R., Tr.)
17

appeal, the missing items will be "presumed to support the actions of the trial court." State v.
Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); accord State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 271 (2018)

(applying that presumption). Since the State has not provided those photographs for this Court's
review, this Court should presume they actually show that a physical examination of the truck
would reveal potential exculpatory value of the truck, and since Officer Middleton took the
photographs, that value would have been apparent to him.
And even if this Court does not apply that presumption about evidence missing from the
record, the fact that the officer took those photographs still disproves the State's arguments on
appeal. At the hearing on this issue, the prosecutor explained that the officer had called her
office to ask about releasing the truck, and she told him it was okay if he "took steps to preserve
what he considered of evidentiary value." 12 (Tr., p.18, L.25 - p.19, L.3.) Therefore, the fact that

Officer Middleton subsequently took pictures of items which he felt had evidentiary value
affirmatively demonstrates that he would have been aware of the potentially-exculpatory value of
that evidence at the time he released the truck.
For all these reasons, this Court should reject the State's arguments about whether
Mr. Sarbacher has shown the officer would have been aware of the potential exculpatory value of
the truck at the time he released it.

12

This procedure, itself, is problematic because, as the Minnesota Court of Appeals aptly
observed: "Police officers, who often investigate a case in its earliest stages, may be unable to
foresee the legal theories the prosecution will pursue and therefore are often in a precarious
position to determine whether evidence is potentially exculpatory, particularly as viewed by
defense counsel." State v. Schmid, 487 N.W.2d 539, 541-42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (noting this
concern reinforces the propriety of applying the presumption of materiality in such
circumstances).
18

2.

The record shows the State acted with bad faith

The district court's conclusion that the state did not act in bad faith is contradicted by the
record. 13 Bad faith has not been expressly defined in this context, but courts have identified
several examples of what would constitute bad faith. For example, "official animus" toward the
accused or "a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence" would qualify. California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984).

Likewise, destruction of evidence subsequent to a

discovery request by the defense qualifies. Stuart, 127 Idaho at 816 (citing United States v.
Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993)). These examples of bad faith are apparent from the
record in this case.
The first fact showing bad faith is the fact that the State disposed of the vehicle before the
preliminary hearing and mere days after the State's initial discovery disclosure. (See R., pp.199;
see also R., p.202 (the officer noting it was released only 19 days after it was seized).) This rises
to level of official animus toward Mr. Sarbacher because, by any measure, that extremely short
window did not afford him a meaningful opportunity to evaluate the State's initial discovery
disclosures so as to even determine what evidence needed to be investigated, much less to
actually have a meaningful opportunity to actually conduct a meaningful investigation of that
evidence. This is particularly true since the prosecutor not only knew of the plan to destroy the
truck, but that defense counsel was not in a position to address the issue. (See Tr., p.18, L.25 p.19, L.3 (acknowledging the officer called her about releasing the truck); R., p.208 (defense
counsel noting that the prosecutor's office was aware he was on vacation at the critical time).)
13

Since trial counsel effectively argued that Officer Middleton acted in bad faith, (see, e.g.,
Tr., p.12, Ls.13-24, p.14, Ls.1-12, Mr. Sarbacher can challenge the propriety of the district
court's conclusion in that regard in this appeal under the concept of right-result, wrong-theory.
See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, _ , 443 P.3d 231, 236-40 (2019) (explaining that the
concept of right-result, wrong-theory is properly argued when the alternative basis was argued
(preserved) below).
19

That there was official animus in this regard is reinforced by the fact that the initial
discovery disclosures did not provide all the relevant information about the truck. Rather, it was
only after the State made late supplemental disclosures following the suppression of
Mr. Sarbacher's illegally-obtained statements that the State disclosed the information that
actually revealed the importance of the truck to its case.

(See R., p.161 (defense counsel

explaining it was only after these late supplemental disclosures that the apparent value of the
truck became apparent).) Thus, the speed with which the State moved to release the truck
demonstrates he was acting in bad faith.
Moreover, by that time Officer Middleton disposed of the truck, Mr. Sarbacher had
actually requested discovery for "tangible objects ... which are material to the preparation of the
defense or intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial, or obtained from or belonging
to the Defendant."

(R., p.26; see also R., p.202 (Officer Middleton acknowledging that

Mr. Sarbacher had told him he suspected exculpatory evidence could be found in the truck prior
to the officer releasing the truck).) That would obviously include the truck in this case. As such,
disposal of the truck at that point in time also demonstrated bad faith. Stuart, 127 Idaho at 816
(noting that destruction of evidence subsequent to a discovery request constitutes bad faith).
Finally, the conclusion that there was bad faith in this case is reinforced by the fact that
the State's motion to reconsideration was based solely on a potentially-perjurious affidavit from
Officer Middleton. Notably, the officer averred that he called trial counsel's office to tell them
he was going to release the truck and heard him saying, "That is their problem, let them deal with
it," in the background. (R., p.201.) Apart from the fact that the officer could not fully confirm
from the background of a telephone call that it was trial counsel, as opposed to any of the other
attorneys or staff who work in his office who made that statement, the State's reliance on that
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assertion is particularly problematic because the prosecutor's office was aware that trial counsel
was not, in fact, in the office at that time.

(R., p.208 (defense counsel noting that the

prosecutor's office knew he was on a family vacation at the time).) The fact that the State would
rely on such a reckless assertion to try and justify the officer's otherwise-unreasonable actions
further reveals official animus toward the defense in this case.
For all these reasons, the record actually shows that the disposal of the truck in this case
was done in bad faith. Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's decision to dismiss
the charges on that correct theory.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Sarbacher respectfully requests this Court affirm the order dismissing the charges m
this case.
DATED this 20 th day of March, 2020.
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BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20 th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas

21

